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Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) have argued that quantum mechanics can be derived from
three cryptographic, or broadly information-theoretic, axioms. But Smolin disagrees, and he has
given a toy theory that he claims is a counterexample. Here we show that Smolin’s toy theory
violates an independence condition for spacelike separated systems that was assumed in the CBH
argument. We then argue that any acceptable physical theory should satisfy this independence
condition.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent note, Smolin [4] has presented a toy theory
that simulates some interesting cryptographic features
of quantum mechanics. Most interestingly, Smolin’s toy
theory satisfies the three cryptographic, or information-
theoretic, axioms from which Clifton, Bub, and Halvor-
son (CBH) [1] have claimed to be able to derive quantum
mechanics. So, Smolin argues that, contra CBH, QM
cannot be derived from these three axioms.
We agree with Smolin that QM is not a logical conse-
quence of the three information-theoretic axioms, taken
in complete isolation from any theoretical context. In
fact, we think that attempting such a derivation would
be futile, as shown by the history of failed attempts (e.g.,
the quantum logic program) to derive QM from com-
pletely explicit, physically plausible axioms. When such
attempts have not failed miserably, their partial successes
have come at the expense of complicating the axioms to
the point of destroying all physical insight.
The failure of attempts at theoretically-neutral deriva-
tions of QM does not undermine the importance of pro-
viding characterizations within some judiciously chosen
framework of background assumptions — these assump-
tions might be explicit (as in CBH’s assumption that the-
ories permit a C∗-algebraic formulation), or they might
be tacit (as, e.g., in Einstein’s assumption that space-
time is continuous and not discrete). For someone con-
cerned with diachronic relationships between theories,
it is an extremely interesting question to ask whether
there is a framework that encompasses both the old and
the new theory, and whether there are salient physi-
cal postulates that distinguish the two theories. CBH
have answered this question in the affirmative for clas-
sical and quantum mechanics: the C∗-algebraic frame-
work encompasses both theories, and quantum mechan-
ics is distinguished in terms of its satisfaction of the three
information-theoretic axioms.
But to be more specific, we argue here that Smolin’s
toy theory is so remote from classical or quantum me-
chanics that it holds little physical interest. In particular,
we show that Smolin’s theory violates an independence
condition for distinct systems that is taken for granted in
both classical and quantum mechanics. We then argue
that the failure of this independence condition leads to
pathologies that are unacceptable in any physical theory.
AGAINST SERIAL NUMBERS
CBH argue that QM can be derived from three axioms:
no superluminal information transfer via measurement,
no cloning [7], and no bit commitment. Roughly speak-
ing, the no cloning axiom says that there cannot be a
machine that accepts arbitrary input states, and returns
two copies of any state it receives. The no bit commit-
ment axiom states that it is not possible for one observer,
Alice, to send a bit value to a second observer, Bob, in
such a way that Bob cannot access the bit value until
Alice provides him with a key, and such that Alice can-
not change her bit value after she has sent it to Bob. It
is well-known that elementary QM satisfies these three
cryptographic axioms. CBH claim that QM can also be
derived from these three axioms, and so the conjunction
of the axioms is equivalent to the claim that QM is true.
Smolin’s toy theory consists of symmetric pairs of lock-
boxes, where each pair of lockboxes has a unique serial
number. Furthermore, each lockbox contains a bit value,
which is accessible to inspection only when the lockbox
is in the presence of its partner. For the details of how
the lockbox theory satisfies the three axioms, we refer the
reader to Smolin’s paper. But note that the assumption
of unique serial numbers is needed to ensure that cloning
is impossible.
Most of the details of Smolin’s lockbox theory are irrel-
evant to his argument against the CBH characterization
2result. Indeed, in his final discussion Smolin claims that
there is a trivial counterexample to the CBH result.
. . . there is a trivial theory that satisfies the
other axioms [i.e., the three axioms of the
CBH characterization argument]. Namely, a
theory with only one type of element, a box
with a unique serial number and no bit value
inside at all. Such a box cannot be cloned or
broadcast, due to the serial number, cannot
communicate superluminally, and cannot be
used for bit commitment. (p. 4)
To “make the question interesting,” Smolin proposes a
fourth cryptographic axiom (viz., the possibility of un-
conditionally secure key distribution), and his lockbox
theory is intended to show that QM does not follow from
the four axioms. However, we maintain that neither the
trivial theory nor the more sophisticated lockbox theory
stand as counterexamples to the claim that QM can be
derived — within a completely reasonable framework —
from the three cryptographic or information-theoretic ax-
ioms. So, we will henceforth ignore the key distribution
axiom.
Smolin’s trivial, one lockbox theory is a special case of
the following construction: consider any classical theory
T , with any finite number of physical objects, and where
all objects travel subluminally. Since T has no ambiguous
mixtures, T does not allow bit commitment. However, in
the absence of further constraints, T permits cloning of
arbitrary pure states [1, Theorem 2]. So, we modify T by
stipulating that cloning is impossible; we can do this by
adding a law which states that there is at least one object
that has a property which no other object can have. (In
Smolin’s theory, P is the serial number of a lockbox pair.)
Let’s call the resulting theory T ′.
The theory T ′ satisfies the three axioms of the CBH
argument, but T ′ is clearly not quantum mechanics. It
would be natural, then, to conclude that the failure of
the CBH theorem to rule out T ′ is due to the further
assumption that physical theories permit a C∗-algebraic
formulation. Although this may be true, we shall show
that T ′ violates a more fundamental independence con-
dition for distinct systems, and so should not be taken
seriously as a physical theory.
THE SCHLIEDER CONDITION
Let A and B denote, respectively, Alice and Bob’s sys-
tems, and let AB denote the composite. At present, we
make no assumptions concerning the mathematical struc-
ture of Alice and Bob’s state spaces, or about the means
for constructing the state space of AB from the state
spaces of A and B. Consider now the following three
independence conditions:
1. (Schlieder Condition) For any states x of A, and y
of B, there is a state z of AB with marginals x and
y. (This is a well-known condition from axiomatic
field theory; see, e.g., [6].)
2. (Duplication of a Known State) For any state x of
A, there is a machine Mx that prepares a state z
of AB with marginals x and x. (Note the order of
the quantifiers.)
3. (Independent Preparation) Alice’s ability to pre-
pare states is independent of the state of Bob’s sys-
tem.
It is clear that all three of these conditions are satis-
fied by the standard Cartesian product representation of
composite systems in classical mechanics, as well as by
the standard tensor product representation of composite
systems in quantum mechanics. CBH also assume a ver-
sion of the Schlieder condition (viz., C∗-independence)
in their derivation of QM [1, p. 1574]. However, Smolin’s
theories violate each of these conditions. In particular,
although there is a state of A in which Alice has a pair of
lockboxes with serial number s, and there is a state of B
in which Bob has a pair of lockboxes with serial number
s, these states are mutually incompatible.
The failure of the Schlieder condition entails that Al-
ice can acquire information about Bob’s system just by
determining her own state (even if she has no prior in-
formation about their joint state). In particular, if Alice
determines that her state is x, and if y is one of Bob’s
states that is incompatible with x, then Alice knows that
Bob’s system cannot possibly be in state y. But if A and
B are distinct (e.g., if they are spacelike separated), then
information about the state of A should not, by itself,
provide information about the state of B. So, there is
reason to think that in Smolin’s theory, we are not really
dealing with distinct physical systems.
The failure of the Independent Preparation condition
entails that there will be mysterious constraints on which
states Alice and Bob can prepare. For example, if there
is no state with marginals x and y, and if Alice’s system
is in state x, then Bob will be frustrated in his attempts
to prepare y. Once again, however, if A and B are in-
dependent systems (e.g., if they are spacelike separated),
what physical mechanism could explain Bob’s inability
to prepare y?
The failure of the Duplication Condition entails that
there are states that no experimenter can duplicate, even
if he is supplied every bit of information about that state,
and even if he has unlimited physical resources. For ex-
ample, in Smolin’s theory, it is impossible to duplicate
a lockbox pair — although we are given no explanation
of what would prevent the experimenter from achieving
this goal. This prohibition on the duplication of states
is much stronger than the ordinary quantum mechani-
cal prohibition on cloning unknown states. In QM, while
3there is no machine that duplicates arbitrary (unknown)
input states, there is, for each fixed state x, a machine
Mx that duplicates x. (Let y be the ready state of the
machine, and let the operation of the machine be given
by the mapping I ⊗ U , where U is a unitary operator
mapping x to y.) Thus, cloning is impossible in QM for
a very different reason from why cloning is impossible in
Smolin’s theory — in QM, the no cloning theorem is a
non-trivial result, whereas in Smolin’s theory it results
from an ad hoc stipulation that states cannot be dupli-
cated.
Finally, the failure of the Schlieder condition also raises
problems for giving an account of measurement interac-
tions. In particular, suppose that Q is an observable that
can take finitely many values q1, . . . , qn, and suppose that
x1, . . . , xn are states in which Q definitely has the cor-
responding value. An ideal measurement of Q is nor-
mally defined as an interaction that perfectly correlates
the states x1, . . . , xn of the object with states y1, . . . , yn
of some measuring apparatus. However, if the Schlieder
condition fails, then there is no guarantee that the poste-
rior states exist, and it becomes unclear how to formulate
a general notion of measurement.
HAECCEITIES AND TELEPORTATION
A theory is haecceitist if it stipulates that each object
has a certain unique ‘thisness’ or haecceity that distin-
guishes it from all other objects — over and above the
totality of its properties that specifies its ‘whatness’ or
quiddity. (We borrow this terminology from metaphysics;
see, e.g., [2].) So, for example, Smolin’s toy theory is
haecceitist because lockbox pairs have unique serial num-
bers. We are unaware of any successful physical theory in
the past, say, 400 years that has been haecceitist in this
sense. But rather than appeal to history, we can rule out
haecceitistic theories by noting that, in a heacceitistic
theory, either teleportation is excluded by fiat because
states with unique haecceities or identifying properties
cannot be prepared (they are simply declared to be ‘read
only’), or superluminal signaling is possible. Since we as-
sume that superluminal signaling is impossible, we rule
out haecceitistic theories because we wish to consider the-
ories in which teleportation is at least prima facie pos-
sible — i.e., we want to come to an understanding of
the physical grounds for the possibility or impossibility
of teleportation.
To see that haecceitist theories cannot satisfy both
teleportation and no superluminal signaling, consider
first a theory in which particles can be created. Then
Alice and Bob can agree to the following protocol for
sending a bit of information superluminally: Alice and
Bob start out together and note the unique identifying
properties P and Q of two particles. Alice goes off with
these particles while Bob tries, alternating once every sec-
ond, to create a particle with property P (respectively,
property Q). In order to signal value 0 to Bob, Alice
destroys her P particle, and Bob becomes aware of this
fact within one second, because he can create a particle
with property P . In order to signal value 1 to Bob, Alice
destroys her Q particle, and again Bob becomes aware of
this fact within one second.
Suppose now that particles cannot be created. Then if
Bob is holding a particle with unique identifying property
P , the only way for Alice to obtain a particle with prop-
erty P is for Bob to send his particle to her. So, either the
particle must travel superluminally, or the particle’s state
cannot be teleported. Therefore, regardless of whether or
not particles can be created, haecceitist theories cannot
have teleportation without superluminal signaling.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that Smolin’s theory violates the
Schlieder condition, and so has a number of physical
pathologies: Alice can gain information about Bob’s sys-
tem by making measurements on her system; there will
be inexplicable constraints on Alice and Bob’s ability to
prepare states; and it is impossible to duplicate known
states. But even if we ignore these pathologies, Smolin’s
theory could be ruled out by requiring that the theories
under consideration should not include assumptions that,
in the context of the information-theoretic axioms, pre-
clude the possibility of teleportation. We conclude from
all of these facts that Smolin’s theory is so different from
the theories we know (viz., classical and quantum me-
chanics) that it need not be taken as a serious physical
possibility.
Recently, Spekkens [5] has constructed a toy theory —
for a different purpose — which could also be used to
challenge the CBH argument. In particular, Spekkens’
toy theory satisfies the three cryptographic axioms of
the CBH argument, but it admits a local hidden vari-
able model, and so is inconsistent with QM. But, un-
like Smolin’s theory, Spekkens’ theory does satisfy the
Schlieder condition (see pp. 17, 20). We can conclude
(by applying the contrapositive of the CBH theorem)
that Spekkens’ theory does not admit a C∗-algebraic for-
mulation. In fact, a stronger claim is proven in [3]: nei-
ther the state space of Spekkens’ theory (which does not
allow arbitrary mixtures), nor the convex extension of
the Spekkens state space, is the state space of a Jordan-
Banach algebra. The JB-algebraic framework is more
general than the C∗-algebraic framework and includes a
very broad class of theories in which the state space has a
convex structure. But we do not think that representabil-
ity within the C∗-algebraic framework or JB-algebraic
framework is a necessary condition for physical possibil-
ity; and so the status of Spekkens’ toy theory vis a vis
the CBH characterization argument should be examined
4in more depth to settle this issue.
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